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Introduction 
 
When I began writing this piece I thought it would focus specifically on the implications 
of curated algorithms. I wondered how a curated algorithm could shape a worldview, contribute 
to political and cultural polarization, and prevent people with different curated algorithms 
manifest on their personalized computer technologies from being able to communicate. As I 
wrote, though, I came to realize that I had to develop a notion of what a worldview is, what it 
consists of, how we come to construct a worldview, how we communicate and reshape our 
beliefs, and what underlies the construction of those beliefs. With these inquiries my project 
dramatically changed form — as it ought to happen. My project is about first coming to grips 
with persuasion and its use. I do this in order to investigate how technologies of today impact 
persuasion and its diminishment, a phenomenon I have taken note of in my day to day. My work 
leads to an attempt to carry the many threads that develop to the end, and the primary thread that 
unites the work is a consideration of the body and its relationship to language. 
My attempt involves an approach to worldviews and the curation therein using a 
Wittgensteinian lens. My first chapter lays the groundwork for my conception of a worldview by 
orbiting the themes of persuasion, the body, belief, and the irrational, all of which are 
fundamental components in my imagination of worldviews. Persuasion, I argue, is a concept that 
cannot be detached from considerations of the body. 
My second chapter deals with defining curation. I explore Heidegger’s “Question 
Concerning Technique” as well as “A Letter on Humanism.” Both of these texts will be essential 
in developing a sense of what curation means. I draw on the Heideggarian notion of enframing, 
or Ge-stell. This understanding of enframing is further expounded upon with an analysis of lyrics 
by Phil Elverum, which delves into the issues of the absurd.  
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The third chapter deals explicitly with the actual curation of worldviews, the whole 
phrase, at this point, well defined. My exploration in this regard is predominantly original and 
therefore dangerous. Working with the epistemological implications of the work, I present space 
for ethical questions to arise, but pose no answers. My purpose is merely to bring these questions 
up, to define them, and to investigate the way in which the irrational — the absurd in life — 
serves as a way of thinking about them. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Persuasion, Coercion & Body 
 
 To say what persuasion essentially is would be a fruitless affair. Persuasion in context is 
what is of concern. Context, however, may lead to the blurring of persuasion on one hand and 
coercion on the other, which are commonly spoken of as opposites and two words worth 
seperating only to show how in ordinary language
1
 they are entangled. That entanglement is of 
initial concern, as it represents the connection between the body and language, which is, to be 
clear, a concern distinct from mind-body dualism.  
Consider, as a preliminary working example, a course on conflict management, especially 
as it relates to conflict in politics or in the context of office work relations. Here, there may be a 
functional distinction between the terms persuasion and coercion. Jim, the Human Resources 
Manager, might want to use the distinction as a way to distinguish between punishable offences 
at work, i.e., coercive action (wherein one physically, or emotionally forces one to get a job 
done), and acceptable practices, i.e., persuasive action (convincing a co-worker that an idea is 
worthwhile and they should do it). To be clear, the distinction here has a functional purpose. It 
                                               
1
 By ordinary language I mean to awaken the notion of words in their everyday use. Philosophers 
have long attempted to subvert the everydayness of meaning by divorcing words from their utterances, 
like in a great deal of metaphysics. By considering words in their ordinary uses, the difficulty of 
crystallizing a salient definition or deciphering an isolated meaning becomes clear. Accepting and 
exploring that language and the meaning of words are often convoluted is itself a philosophical approach 
that can assist in attempts to understand extrapolate concepts, while simultaneously recognizing the limits 
of concepts more broadly. This point is elaborated further in Donald Davidson’s “On the Very Idea of a 
Conceptual Scheme,” which plays an important role in my thinking throughout this paper. 
4 
 
 
represents an ordinary (that is, ordinary insofar as it is ordinary within the language game
2
 posed 
here) use of the words persuasion and coercion. It separates coercion from persuasion to 
emphasize the inappropriate role of physical or emotional torment in a particular context: the 
office. If the office example is stripped from its context and we take the working, functional 
definitions as rigid absolutes, what we are left with is a deeply warped understanding of the 
distinction between persuasion and coercion, as the rigidity of this distinction outside of this 
language game is not so neat. 
To persuade is to interact with the emotional, physical, and psychological states of 
another, all of which are intertwined.   
Persuasion, the attempt to impart a belief, necessarily involves the body, which is to say, 
emotion, passion, mental states, the space that the body
3
 is in, etc.. I mean to emphasize the role 
of the corporeal in persuasion. In a polemical sense, I am deliberately prioritizing gesticulation 
that is concerned with persuasion as it reinforces the notion that persuasion is an embodied 
practice. Aristotle’s Rhetoric provides an early account of this line of thinking. While Aristotle is 
undoubtedly entrenched in Platonic essentialism, which I am by no means espousing, his work 
on persuasion and the role of emotion, or pathos, in Rhetoric opens up avenues for exploring the 
persuasion-coercion dichotomy. Pathos, in my language, represents the mode of persuasion 
discussed in Aristotle’s Rhetoric that involves the invocation of emotion and a care for context 
and audience. Using pathos as opposed to simply emotion, which will happen throughout this 
                                               
2
 I use language game in line with Wittgenstein in order to indicate that I am speaking about a 
form of language that is limited and not representative or claiming to speak to the whole of language. 
Language games are a way of exploring concepts by investigating ordinary life.  
3
 In my terms, body is meant to encapsulate a great deal. It by no means excludes the mind or 
constructs a dualism, but instead invokes not simply emotion and that which is tied to the discourse I 
frame in that sense, but it reinforces the Davidsonian notion that is implicitly prevalent throughout this 
project that in thinking through concepts we are thinking in, at, from, (etc.) a perch, or a vantage point. 
(Davidson, 7). 
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project, indicates that more than simply appeals to emotion are happening, but instead speaks to 
the complexity and depth of the role of emotion in language. In order to hop on board with my 
analysis and use of Aristotle I invite the reader to drop Aristotle’s baggage which is the residue 
of Platonic essentialism. Platonic essentialism attempts to say what something is and presumes 
that this naming aligns with a higher conceptual order, an order that asserts itself as severed from 
ordinary life.  
While in many regards Aristotle’s focus on everydayness is a way out of this, the 
background of essentialism lends itself to a kind of realism that presumes that the everyday, 
while maybe not connected to a higher order, still is what it is. Realism, in this sense, is born out 
of a Platonic essentialism that informs Aristotle’s work, but by no means casts it into the realm 
of the archaic. Indeed, much of Aristotle’s work does not rely on this kind of realism, it simply 
espouses it in its given historical context. It is in this way that we can usefully bring Aristotle 
into conversation with Wittgenstein in an attempt to elaborate a theory of persuasion. 
The body, for Aristotle, has an important role, in a preliminary and rough sense, in the 
language one uses and the way one interprets language. Role, in this sense, means a part, insofar 
as the body is a part of language, the body grounds language in its everydayness, the kind of 
everydayness of language that metaphysics often attempts to transcend via the abstract. On a 
very basic note, the same comment will strike me differently when I am happy than when I am 
sad (same so far as it is the same on the set of criteria like phrasing, inflection, body language, 
etc. on the part of speaker). Indeed, Aristotle explicitly argues that “our judgements when we are 
pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile” (Aristotle, 168), which 
may strike the reader as intuitive, but this claim is a seed laid for the argument against 
essentialism. This is grounds for an argument against essentialism insofar as it gives thought to 
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the realization that perception is — in a rough sense — a projection. I mean projection in the 
sense that one’s sense data is carved up based on their personal experiences.4 How I view the 
world, how I, in a given moment, interpret or intend to carve out what is depends not on the thing 
itself necessarily, but my role, my state, in defining, in constructing a cohesive image (literally 
and figuratively) of that thing. The reason Aristotle does not see it that way has a great deal to do 
with the fact that this statement is framed in the context of pathos.  
Pathos, in Aristotle’s terms is a discourse devoid of truth-value of the higher platonic 
order. Regardless of the philosophical and more specifically epistemological value we give to the 
pathos discourse, it stands fast that our judgements are subject to our state of being in a given 
moment. Again, for Aristotle, judgement is distinct from truth. To be persuaded by an idea raised 
by a speaker and believing in it — even if it is not true in the highest order in a Platonic sense — 
does not have epistemological implications for Aristotle, only rhetorical implications. 
Fundamental here though, is the entanglement of judgement and the body, and specifically, pain. 
Here, the body, in a physical sense, is playing into Aristotle’s consideration of persuasion. The 
line between persuasion and coercion is made fuzzy again.  
To be persuaded is to make judgements, to make decisions, which are contingent upon 
one’s habitus, a condition of the body that is itself contingent on the context that body inhabits. 
These decisions, these judgements, come to form the foundation of our beliefs. This is part of the 
nebulous web of words and one’s associations with their own vocabulary (with other words, with 
                                               
4
 To elaborate this point further, for the skeptic, consider a motorcycle mechanic. When I look at 
a motorcycle, I see a mess of metal that I cannot possibly understand, and I see it in large clumps. When 
my father, a mechanic, looks at that same machine, he sees a world of complexity, an abundance of parts I 
cannot even begin to imagine, as I have not engaged the materials. It is in this sense that perception is a 
projection. We see the same object differently as a result of our prior personal experience with the object 
at hand. My purpose here is to consider how one’s emotional state, their bodily disposition, can further 
complicate this relationship. 
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experiences, emotions, etc.), which we come to use to order the world. This is a practice, like 
riding a skateboard. In the same way that one comes to deepen their skateboarding abilities and 
begins seeing staircase railings as grind rails, one who comes to deepen their belief in a god 
might start seeing that god in the fog on their windshield. Here, I am beginning to literalize a 
metaphor.  Worldview, or Weltanschauung in German, comes down to the ground. A worldview 
is not only a metaphor for the notion that our language, the words we use, the things we carve 
out and individuate, impacts how we carve out meaning regarding the world, but worldview is 
literalized insofar as language has a profound impact on how we see things in the world, how we 
literally perceive the world around us. 
 
“Moving” Beyond Reason 
 
Zeke’s roommate is amiable, handsome, etc.. His roommate panders in the halo effect. 
His roommate also despises when dishes are left in the sink. No amount of reason has ever led 
Zeke to believe that dishes are worth doing immediately after they eat. Comfortable digestion 
will permanently outweigh any suggestion otherwise. For Zeke, there is no sensation better than 
sitting on the couch and lazing away with some warm tea. When his roommate really wants the 
dishes done, and he knows Zeke has just eaten and is digesting, he persuades Zeke with appeals 
to emotion, which is to say the tone of his voice, his facial expressions, his visible annoyance, 
etc.. There is a clear physicality to this act of imparting the belief that the dishes are worth doing 
immediately. But is it not odd to call this imparting a belief? In the end, Zeke puts down his tea 
and exclaims “alright! You have persuaded me. I will do it.” But wasn’t he forced to do it? Did 
he have another option?  
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If we continue with a false sense of rigidity regarding the definition of persuasion — one 
that takes persuasion as distinct from coercion insofar as that distinction would suggest that the 
body, force, threats, etc. are not’ involved in the encounter — Zeke’s comment would be 
nonsense, as it is clear that a great deal influences the interaction beyond the actions in the 
circumstance itself. The setting is not the office. Does it matter what we name the cause? Does it 
not only matter that we can name the conditions and that we move from there? What matters 
here is that so-called persuasion, with all of the ambiguities that lie therein when one attempts to 
transcend context in their discussion of the word, still seems to come into use when dealing with 
that which is beyond reason. If persuasion is the mode through which we impart belief, than the 
implications are of significant interest. Even if persuasion is the mode through which we impart 
something other than belief and it entails new behaviors and interactions with the world, its 
implications are still deeply important for us to consider. This case, as opposed to the office, 
shows that persuasion involves the kinds of things in language and in the body that cannot be 
easily transcribed unless we can name what resists naming, what moves away from naming — 
note the irrational, the absurd. 
Wittgenstein argues that “at the end of reasons comes persuasion,” (OC, S. 612) but I do 
not take this to mean that persuasion does not involve reason. Note that the quote is about 
“reasons,” not reason. What Wittgenstein is getting at is the relationship between bodies in 
attempts to impart belief — or stated differently and more broadly (and more problematically) — 
to alter one’s view of the world. The relationship between bodies involves going beyond reason 
exactly because the body, in my terms, represents the irrational, the emotional, and yet it serves 
as the vessel through which we communicate, it is a part of communication in a fundamental 
way. Aristotle’s exploration of pathos is concerned with the appeals to emotion we make amidst 
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persuasive speech acts. Wittgenstein is exploring the exact same question in distinct terms, but 
the role of the body cannot be understated, as it is home to the sensory apparati that form the 
foundation for pathos, for emotional appeals, for the irrational. Wittgenstein’s point is that we 
can be made to believe something by that which goes beyond reason, beyond logos
5
 in the 
Aristotelian sense. Indeed, Aristotle would take no issue with this, he views pathos as 
fundamental in the context of persuasion. Pathos is beyond reason insofar as we do not, at least 
typically, reason our emotions (though, in the context of something like theater, this claim 
obviously breaks down). The difference for Wittgenstein however is that persuasion is part of 
how we construct meaning and systems of knowledge — how we come to see the world, which 
allows us to begin speaking about worldviews in a way that is useful. 
Indeed, if “language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination" (OC, S. 475), then 
how could we ever subject it to the supposed rigor of rationality and expect this approach to lead 
to Truth? How might we provide a logic for language if language itself did not develop logically, 
with consistency? It seems that pain, the emotional, that which Aristotle and Wittgenstein both 
explore as places of blurring in language, all involved in an exploration of the body and its role 
in language, are the best place to evidence the claim that language is not born out of a rational 
ordering that belongs to some higher order. If one’s pain can be said to affect their judgements, 
then how might we transcribe this pain? How might we transcribe the body? What does it mean 
when one is sad? How much can be grasped that is intended? That language did not emerge out 
of a kind of ratiocination is evidenced by persuasion — the attempt to impart belief — being 
beyond reason. The office has every reason to draw a line that seems subject to a kind of logos, 
                                               
5
 In Greek, logos connotes a contrast with pathos insofar as it indicates that which involves logic, 
as opposed to that which is subject to emotion. For the purposes of this project, this brief description is 
adequate. 
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but Zeke, it seems, does not, as Zeke’s case is mired in pathos. Despite the difficulty in 
transcribing the body, it plays a fundamental role in what we come to believe and what we come 
to see in the world. This is no mere irony, nor a truism, but a nod to the irrational and an 
acceptance of the uncertainty we must encounter in philosophy if we give due diligence to the 
everyday and to the body. Even if we could rationalize an emotional expression, if we could 
name the neural pathways and the sensory modalities that were involved in the event, as modern 
science attempts to do, how much would we learn about the experience itself? This question 
might not be philosophical in its nature and it is certainly beyond the scope of this attempt, but it 
is worth a wink, as philosophy is best served by opening more doors than it closes.  
 
Interpretation Beyond Reason 
 
Now, I will frame persuasion again, with the intention of deliberately blurring: the act of 
coercing another into believing an idea. In a rough sense, persuasion is contingent upon two 
basic criteria (to be fair, this could be said of many phrases): (1) the existence of a community of 
speakers and (2) a space for speakers to enter discourse. 
One might be tempted to say that, in light of 1, without a common language one could 
simply not persuade another person into a desired end, but only physically coerce them, like 
trying to catch a mouse in a trap. You could not very well tell a mouse, “come here and stand on 
this trap.” In this context, coercion, as an approach to moving from a means to an ends, involves 
force or threats necessarily, as opposed to reasoning. This would suggest, then, that two humans 
without a common language are like a mouse and a human, but who is the mouse? Clearly, 
neither. To be the mouse, so to speak, would be to have a language that is untranslatable, in a 
sense this would add up to having a private language, a notion which, for now, we will defer to 
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Wittgenstein’s complex dismissal of. Individuals can express themselves with6 their body and 
interpret the moves of others, consider gesticulation and the whole lot; however, even the 
language games of the body may be different, the whole lot might include that which cannot be 
easily interpreted, or interpreted at all. To interpret a gesticulation as pained, one must believe 
that the other is in pain. How might we substantiate that belief? What circumstance would even 
require that one names the reasons for this belief? This mode of belief, the belief that someone is 
in pain, is odd exactly because to doubt that someone was in pain would require a special 
circumstance. For instance, at the theatre. And yet, our conception of a worldview must 
incorporate this kind of belief, belief that is involved with that which moves beyond reason, 
because — while it may not be neat and convenient for the sake of argument — belief of this 
kind can be sensibly spoken of despite its evasion of doubt.    
A particular intention behind a gesticulation may be entirely misinterpreted by another 
viewer with a distinct language, operating in their own language game. To be a speaker is to 
have a language, which is to interpret and intend, to persuade, and to be persuaded, and even to 
assume and to doubt. This does not necessarily require the same language as another, but any 
language at all — a capacity to think. And yet, force and threats, when they cannot be spoken 
can only be acted out by a body, by the physical. While this dichotomy is useful for the sake of 
the argument, the reader ought to pause and question the notion that what is spoken is somehow 
not itself a form of physical violence. Do we not hear through our ears, are our ears not physical 
apparti responsible for the processing of particular sense data?  
One might, for instance, use peanut butter to increase the chance of catching the mouse in 
the trap. Is it not odd though, that it makes sense here to speak of coercing a mouse into a trap, 
                                               
6
 The use of “with,” as opposed to “through” or something of the sort helps avoid a claim I am 
not trying to make. I am not trying to construct a distinction between the body and language, but rather 
explore them by investigating the blurred connections. 
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through the use of force or threat via physical objects, but it would be nonsense to speak of 
persuading the mouse to enter the trap, unless it was here spoken about metaphorically, or if our 
understanding of persuasion were flexible enough to allow for physical coercion to be a part of 
the criteria. If that were the case, what language game would one be operating in? Well, it seems 
that this rigidity is rarely the case. I wonder how often a friend has ever been called out on 
nonsense for claiming they could persuade a mouse into a trap.  
What might the realization that bringing any notion of persuasion into the mouse context 
tell us about a theory of persuasion more broadly? Anything at all? Does this insinuate that 
persuasion is contingent upon a common language and that coercion is not?  
Consider the case of Cyrl leading a clearly parched traveller, a traveller who does not 
speak Cyrl’s language, to a pond with potable water. The traveller, lets say, was immensely 
hesitant to drink the water from the pond and of course one could not introspect their mental 
state and unveil why.. It is plausible that they the traveller was uncertain if the water would get 
them sick, but it is just as plausible that the traveller believes water is boring and the traveller 
would rather perish than drink it. Without a common language, how might we contradict this 
claim? Let us also add — to ground the example before we derail it — that this traveller knows 
empirically, based on a map, that very soon they will be at a campsite where they have a water 
purification device and hence the traveller is not acting out of necessity if they do drink from the 
pond. In response to this possibility, let us say Cyrl cups the water in their hands and sips it, and 
wave the other person over, all with a smile. The parched traveller crouches down and drinks. It 
seems, then, they were persuaded that the water is safe. The idea was that the water was safe to 
drink, the goal was to get the traveller to believe said idea, and the goal was achieved. Though, 
this was clearly not coercion, as no force or threat was used. Clearly, persuasion has a great deal 
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to do with the body, with physical objects. If we assume that language is limited to letters and 
speech acts, there was no language game unfolding. Though, we can still maintain (1) as a 
quality, insofar as the traveller is a speaker, with their own community, and despite not sharing 
the same language, a language, any language, was fundamental in the exchange. Even without a 
common language, one can persuade and persuaded, so long as they can be moved — moved to 
think, moved to feel. 
 
Judgement & Body 
 
To pretend that one is persuaded without coercion requires that one separate rational 
speech on one hand and the body (emotion, neurochemical reactions, pains, etc.). The body is a 
central component in persuasion, whether in speech or when reading a text, all of the factors 
mentioned are at play.  
 While Aristotle saw philosophy as a discipline entangled with forms, with facts, amidst 
the pursuit of knowledge, he says that “the arousing of prejudice, pity, anger, and similar 
emotions has nothing to do with the essential facts, but is merely a personal appeal to the man 
who is judging the case” (Rhetoric, 76), and he is speaking of this circumstance in the context of 
persuasive speech. Pathos comes to be a fundamental part of meaning-making, of framing a 
worldview. The danger can be said to be that emotion, pathos, can be employed to distract from 
truth claims, to lead us away from essential forms, and henceforth, knowledge. This danger, 
though, is only dangerous to essentialism. It only clears the way for a deeper understanding of 
how we come to see the world and how that view may come to be curated. Indeed, with all of 
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this in mind, we can begin to bridge the gap between Aristotle and Wittgenstein, and see their 
philosophies as compatible, allowing that the essentialist baggage
7
 is dropped.  
Close attention to pathos is what leads to effective persuasion in a practical sense. The 
tone of voice when a speaker utters a word, the way the listener feels when they encounter those 
words, the space they are standing in, the memories the speaker and listener may have fostered in 
that space, etc. all have an impact on the meaning they derive from the speech act. We must not 
be concerned merely with the speech act itself, but also with what lies around it. This view, in 
the context of knowledge, is incompatible with Aristotle’s understanding of Platonic forms and 
cannot make sense within his framework, insofar as essential forms become subject to context 
and subjectivity; however, in the context of persuasion, of judgements, it is fundamental for 
Aristotle. In the context of unearthing truths, arriving at knowledge, the body is a useless 
consideration for Aristotle. But when, with Wittgenstein, we begin to see knowledge as “related 
to a decision (Entscheidung)” (OC, 47, S. 362), a decision necessarily mired in idiosyncrasies, 
and we understand decisions as requiring judgement to come to those decisions, decisions that 
involve the body, we begin to see that a consideration of pathos in the context of knowledge is 
entirely pertinent.  
Indeed, Wittgenstein flips the idea of forms on its head in a transfiguration of the word 
‘form.’ In order for propositions to be liable to doubt, he argues, there must be things we do not 
doubt. We are apt at cutting down trees, and any doubt about the existence of a tree would be an 
absurdity, besides in the context of a philosopher’s dilemma, or something in that vein. But, 
through his questioning of whether or not the tree exists, Wittgenstein arrives at what he names 
“comfortable certainty,” which can be chocked up to the kinds of things, like the existence of a 
                                               
7
 Keep in mind the description of Aristotle’s flavor of essentialism described earlier in this 
chapter.  
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tree, that we can know and would be impossible if it were otherwise in an ordinary context and if 
that impossibility was challenged it would lead to complete and utter bewilderment. He calls this 
“comfortable certainty” a “form of life” (OC, 46, S. 356). Here the word ‘form’ comes to 
represent a deep-seated subjectivity. Rather than forms suggesting a kind of essentialism, 
Wittgenstein uses the word to get at the contingency of our comfort with certain propositions. 
Forms of life come to represent the messy idiosyncratic associations that one has with the words 
that they employ in particular language games that form a nebulous web of meaning that informs 
the way they see the world. If our certainty is subject to the conditions of particular context, than 
a truth necessarily becomes a foundation for only that context — it does not extend beyond the 
particularities of the language-game.  
I am not arguing that truth is merely relative. Rather, truth can be spoken of in objective 
terms, within a particular language game; however, we must be careful in our imagination of the 
limits and extent of the meaningfulness of terms like truth beyond their context. This is distinct 
from the charges of relativism insofar as it does not at all reject the notion that objective speech 
is not only plausible, but constantly used. The limits of my vantage point are the limits of my 
capacity for objectivity, but that by no means rules out the notion of objectivity that relativism 
attempts to do away with. Donald Davidson describes this saliently when he argues first “that the 
truth of a sentence is relative to (among other things) the language to which it belongs” 
(Davidson, 11) and later that the “truth of sentences remains relative to language, but that is as 
objective as can be” (Davidson, 20).  
Aristotle’s understanding regarding persuasion and his emphasis of the role of pathos 
within that context has a great deal of overlap with Wittgenstein’s understanding of the body in 
the context of certainty. Wittgenstein argues that “it is not that on some points men know the 
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truth with perfect certainty. No: perfect certainty is only a matter of their attitude” (OC, 52, S. 
404). A missionary attempting to convert another is not relying on certainty, but faith, and their 
certainty is not a factual certainty, but is rather made manifest in their disposition, in their tone, 
in their body language, their attitude. This disposition, the embodiment of certainty, is 
instrumental in constructing a worldview.  
The coupling of the notion of forms of life with the idea that comfortable certainty is 
often an attitude rather than a thought come to be at the foundation of a theory of language 
games. The taking away or taking on (nehmen an or annehmen) forms of life and certain 
attitudes in particular contexts means having assumptions, explicit or implicit, about certain 
things which cannot be doubted. Indeed, nehmen an and annehmen, both are translated as 
“assumption” in the English translation of On Certainty, but they reflect taking away or taking 
on respectively. In this sense, an assumption is dynamic. It is dynamic insofar as it involves both 
intending an interpreting, which come to be at the basis of how we construct beliefs, act on 
certainties, and frame a worldview. We do this when we throw words out there and see what 
lands, what moves work within a language game, and by seeing what fails.  
The realist might argue that we are a passive receptor of what is out there. This view does 
not object to the notion that there are things out there (things in a much more limited sense 
insofar as those things, as material itself is something to be carved out by a perceiver), but takes 
issue, in a more limited sense, with the notion that what is perceived is not subject to the 
idiosyncrasies that are involved in crafting a perception. Our faculties are subject to our selves. 
Indeed, in our engagement with language, we take on what works. What one sees as working 
comes to be a part of how they see the world, how one approaches problems. In the same sense, 
we do this by listening to others, by taking away their moves, the phrases that have use in a 
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language game. Assumptions allow for moves to be made without every move being subject to 
doubt. The assumption “forms the basis of action… of thought” (OC, 52, S. 411). We assume 
that the sensation of pain means that one is in pain, and this clears the possibility that we may be 
moved to do something about it. 
It is these assumptions, assumptions about certain things that we do not even name in 
ordinary language, like the existence of a tree, that “belong to the foundation of a language 
game… the entire system of our language-games” (OC, 52, S. 411). But these assumptions can 
come into conflict. For instance, the assumption that there is, or is not a god, or that there are 
many gods. How can a missionary convert a native who assumes there are many gods, not just 
one. Certainly reason does not go far enough. Any reasons contrary to the notion that there are 
many gods is built into the notion itself, it accounts for attempts to evidence otherwise. Religions 
have been built on their ability to persuade others, to transcend reason and to create new 
language games, new foundations, all while harnessing the attitude of certainty. Now, we can 
find a parallel in contemporary life with political parties. Certainty regarding an agenda is not 
only embodied though, but employed across new technological mediums. That these active 
techniques, manifest in technologies, involve in a certain sense a lack of embodiment of the 
attitude of certainty. The body becomes loosely tethered to the attitude as it becomes acted on 
through technologies that evade the hands. This claim will be given much more labor in the next 
chapter, but it is important to begin introducing it here, in somewhat vague terms, to pre-empt a 
more thorough investigation. 
What changes these assumptions about whether there is one god or many gods is not 
reason, but persuasion. While Descartes and others were debating the existence of God, framing 
the question, and constructing arguments, missionaries were out in the field persuading people of 
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their beliefs. The employment of persuasion, which relies on a range of assumptions, requires a 
series of decisions and judgements, has long been a means through which humans come to get 
each other on board with a particular or general worldviews. The idiosyncrasies of a worldview 
seem to have a great deal to do with the range of ideas one has encountered — that one has 
encountered persuasively, that is. 
 
Belief & Body 
 
An attempt to impart a belief, to instill a conviction is a deeply muddled process, one not 
defined simply by reason. If there is a man who believes that the world came into being fifty 
years ago — one who grew up in a circumstance so special such that the reasons for doubting 
this are already considered in the worldview which is his lens — reasons are not enough. If one 
simply provides reasons, nothing more, in an attempt to dissuade this man from his belief, it will 
do nothing, so long as reason is all that is at play. All those reasons are already a consideration in 
his worldview and therefore any other reasons are disregardable. But how can only reason be at 
play? What does it mean to say that? In its longer form, Wittgenstein says, “I said I would 
'combat’ the other man,—but would I not give him reasons? Certainly; but how far do they go? 
At the end of reasons comes persuasion. (Think what happens when missionaries convert 
natives.)” (OC, S. 612). Persuasion is being contrasted with mere argument, with justifications 
that do not account for things like emotion, or the body, or, as Aristotle conceives of it, pathos.  
To engage pathos, to look towards context, to examine language games as language 
games is to subvert the polemical paradigm, to lead language back to the self, and to foster a 
sense of self that is opposed to other individuals, such that the polemical suddenly turns back in, 
self-annihilating, and clears space for the body to enter. If thinking was manifest in a standing 
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out, in the Heideggerian sense, or a leading back, in the Wittgensteinian sense, or a turning 
around, in the Emersonian sense, we would not be able to think without a spine to rise with, legs 
to be led, or hips to turn. Just as thinking, in all of these metaphors, calls on a kind of motion, an 
action even, we think because we are moved to think, just as we are moved to tears. The body, 
emotion, what Aristotle sums up with the term pathos, defines a mode of persuasion that, at its 
core, uses the body, the irrational, as a means of imparting belief, of getting one to move from 
uncertainty to certainty while subverting the strictly rational. Indeed, the etymological 
connection between emotion and moving are at the source of my analogy. Further, though, I’m 
tempted to ask, why do we think? To call thinking an inert seems, on one hand, to mean very 
little, to be nearly vacuous. By equation, it would seem the same could be said of calling thinking 
a moving affair. Although, it seems to me that thinking requires a motivation, to think beyond 
necessity involves a kind of going beyond the immediate, this involves emotion, this involves a 
kind of moving. To be struck by a thought is not only to be thinking, but to be embodied, to be 
emotional, to be capable of moving or being moved in this sense. 
 In January, during an ice storm, I read Camus’s “On Suicide.” Upon reading the final 
sentence, my tear ducts emitted a liquid. I laid in a hammock for an hour, in the cold, on the back 
porch. I read the same essay again, a year and a half later. It was summer, I was on the beach. I 
wondered why I read it again. Clearly, the argument never changed. I had. And sure this suggests 
perception as a projection, but only in the former circumstance was I persuaded. To be persuaded 
is to be in such a way that the contingencies of a given moment open you up to even considering 
a series of propositions. “Whether a proposition can turn out false after all depends on what I 
make count as determinants for that proposition” (OC, 2) claims Wittgenstein, bluntly. Well, 
does confidence of the speaker and/or a writer count as a determinant? If this was a determinant, 
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certainly our certainty is founded upon shaky foundations. But that foundation is a principle, and 
are not all principles based on judgements about those principles being justifiable principles? So 
are not all judgements then premised on principles that are themselves judgements?  
 If someone believes the earth is only fifty years old, and all evidence contrary to that 
claim fits neatly into their worldview, as it has already been anticipated and reasoned away, how 
might they come to change their mind? Certainly reason would fall short. If an argument is 
persuasive enough, maybe their belief will be altered. But once again, we encounter the issue of 
persuasion. Here, we must again recall the pathos in which Aristotle frames his conception of 
persuasion in Rhetoric. The time of year, the unique circumstances surrounding my current lot, 
the very room I am in, will all have an impact on my perception and interpretation of certain 
propositions. Just as the one proposing something will have the nature of their proposal altered 
by the same ephemeral and innumerable possibilities at play when they utter their proposition. 
All of these factors involve the body and its faculties. So we see that circumstance and belief are 
entangled. This is only to echo the notion that the body and belief are entangled, and very word 
body involves its habitus, what lies around it. 
 
Contingency & Body 
 
The totality of one’s certainties, of one’s beliefs, constitute a kind of worldview, or at 
least part of the notion of a worldview. Richard Rorty argues that one has a final vocabulary 
which they employ in communication — a final vocabulary is never final insofar as it is 
unchanging, but something that constantly moves, transforms, and alters. It is final only insofar 
as words are doing things and the words in play are, well, the words. A final vocabulary 
represents a nebulous web of not only the phrases in use, but the language game at play, the 
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associations with particular words built on idiosyncratic experiences, etc.. This totality (roughly) 
of one’s vocabulary is made up of beliefs, convictions, feelings, etc. and it is not exactly static or 
additive, but flexible and viable to change dramatically from one moment to the next, from one 
mood swing or memory to another. The philosophy of language cannot merely be concerned 
with vocabularies, but with what “lies around it” (OC, 21, S. 144) as Wittgenstein frames it. 
What lies around it, in a simple sense, is a comment on the importance of what makes a belief 
hold fast, which is the context in which the belief is brought into being. The belief that is held 
fast, as opposed to the belief that is liable to shift, is said to be held fast by the system that lies 
around it, the system of knowledge, the system of “what is believed” holds in place a particular 
belief. If a particular belief does not fit into the system, it is liable to be shifted. But what causes 
the potential for a shift? What opens one up to the possibility that a particular belief is not held 
fast, that it is not entirely compatible with the system that lies around it? 
Rorty argues that in order to see how one can be opened up to the possibility that a belief 
is incompatible with a worldview, with their system of beliefs, we must limit our examination of 
“the opposition between rational and irrational forms of persuasion to the interior of a language 
game” (CIS, 47-48). This is to say that to construct a division that puts reason (or rational 
conviction, in Rorty’s terms) on one side and emotion (or passion, in Rorty’s terms) is not useful 
on its own, unless it is qualified as being a persuasive speech act. Further, he tempers the 
distinction by making clear that we ought to understand the terms reason and emotion as reason 
being akin to rational conviction, and emotion as being the sort of thing that arises due to causes, 
as opposed to reasons. The claim that reasons can be a cause for emotion is entirely justified, at 
this juncture, but Rorty means something very particular by causes.  
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For Rorty, causes are specifically, simply put, “not reasons.” (CIS, 47-48) Though, 
causes cannot be usefully spoken of outside of the limitations of a language game. In order to 
delineate this distinction, Rorty notes the obvious differences between what is conveyed in a 
Socratic dialogue as opposed to the diminished role of reason and the employment of cause in 
hypnotic suggestion. While there is a kind of intuitive inclination to accept the distinction, it only 
scratches the surface of the distinction, and Rorty does not deny this. Indeed, to accept the 
distinction so simply would be self-defeating, as it has no proper place within the confines of a 
contextualized language game. Rorty, though, is less concerned with truth values than he is with 
the use value of such a distinction: “within a language game, within a set of agreements about 
what is possible and important, we can usefully distinguish reasons for belief from causes for 
belief which are not reasons” (CIS, 47-48). Causes for belief which are not reasons falls into the 
rough category of persuasion. Rorty argues that since there is “no neat way to draw the line 
between persuasion and force” there is “therefore no neat way to draw a line between a cause of 
a changed belief which was also a reason and one which was a ‘mere’ cause” (CIS, 48). 
Nonetheless, what is made salient through this analysis is that within the interior of a language 
game, we can begin to parse out rough sketches of these distinctions, such that we can begin to 
imagine what the curation of these facets of language might mean. 
 
Pain  
 
In order to further clarify the close of the last section, I will lay out a consideration of 
pain and curation. This will begin to clear space for a discussion about curation in the context of 
persuasion, which the next chapter will focus on. Rorty thinks it is not only possible, but 
meaningful, to ‘“separate the question "Do you believe and desire what we believe and desire?" 
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from the question "Are you suffering?"’ (CIS, 198). The implications of such a distinguishment 
cannot be understated, for Rorty. This is fundamental in creating human solidarity, which is the 
central concern of his book. While a great deal of his philosophy reinforces the ideas herein, this 
is where we differ. Suffering, belief, and desire are deeply entangled. Indeed, they cannot be 
separated. To disentangle them would be to subject belief and desire to exactly the kind of 
rationalization that Rorty sees himself sees as rebelling against, the Enlightenment sort. Rorty 
recognizes this problem, but tries to portray it as purely problematic when it transcends the limits 
of a language game, but he understands the separation to be useful, only somewhat problematic, 
when one works within the limits of a language game. 
It is not that any line is fuzzy, it is that speaking of a line in the first place is riddled with 
metaphysical ambiguity that cannot be parsed out. Let us revisit the example of the parched 
traveller. Does it make sense to speak of the sensation of dizziness, of a dry throat, of thirst itself 
as a reason for wanting water? Maybe so, but it makes more sense to speak of it as a cause for a 
desire, a cause that would lead one to believe that the water from a stranger is safe. So, can 
bodily sensation be said to be a reason? Or is it merely a cause? How can we disentangle 
sensation from reason? Do emotions, sensations, the body, its parts, its ephemeral needs and 
desires play a role in our persuasion, or our resting potential to be persuaded, in what we take on 
or take away, which is to say does not the body still, even within a language game, behave not as 
one side of a line, metaphorically speaking in Rorty’s term, but as a part of a whole that cannot 
function without its other parts? By limiting ourselves to the vocabulary of the language game in 
an analysis of claims makes us vulnerable to forget, in the Wittgensteinian sense, what lies 
around it. In the effort to separate the questions "Do you believe and desire what we believe and 
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desire?" from the question "Are you suffering?" we must tread carefully to not forget what lies 
around suffering, what lies around belief and desire. 
If I was tasked with removing all of the parts of a body that are divisible from the 
faculties that facilitate thinking, god forbid, such that one would continue to think, to reason, 
unimpaired what could I remove? If I remove a thumb, might that change a person's thoughts? 
And if the thoughts are now different, while they can still think, what they think about will be 
different, and I have now changed the way that the faculties perceive and hence think about the 
world. If a book must now be picked up differently, is the book, as an object the thinker carves 
out in the world, now different? Does the person believe the book to be one way, and after losing 
a thumb, now believe it to be different? They certainly would have to approach the object 
differently, that is. Let us say that the difficulty of raising the book and reading the book has now 
become such a task, that the person no longer reads books. The sight of a book is now a trauma, 
it triggers a memory of what once was. Does that count as an impairment? How might I even 
begin to parse causes for belief and reasons for belief in this context? Does it make sense to even 
speak of belief here? Well, what if they believe that books are a source of pleasure, but since 
they cannot engage them, they believe they are a sore sight. But a person would not believe this, 
they would feel it. But how do you name this feeling, how might we even begin to parse this out, 
even within the language game itself these phrases do not split apart? So when Rorty speaks of 
separating the questions "Do you believe and desire what we believe and desire?" from the 
question "Are you suffering?" we have to wonder if we can limit belief, desire, and suffering to a 
single language game, when it seems they come to be at the foundation of many language games. 
Now, this process, the process that leads to the blurring of these separate questions, is the kind of 
thing that happens in an attempt to curate a reality. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Curation 
 
 This chapter will give a broad overview of curation, a term I mean to intertwine with and 
build out
8
 of Heidegger’s Ge-stell — for now, this can be roughly translated as enframing. 
Heidegger’s “The Question Concerning Technique” deals broadly with the impact of technology 
on life and language.
9
 In order to elaborate my understanding of curation, to prepare for a full-
fledged exploration of the idea of the curation of worldviews, it will be necessary to explicate the 
complexities of Heidegger’s essay, as it is the starting place for my thinking about curation. 
Indeed, curation, in the highly particularized sense in which I will employ it, will rightly be 
interpreted as akin to Ge-stell. I will not be writing about Heidegger’s essay in a chronological 
way, but will tackle fundamental phrases, one by one, which will be sub-headings, as a way of 
giving a broad preface to the relation between Ge-stell and curation. To temper the investigation 
of the themes in “A Question Concerning Technique” I will use Heidegger’s “Letter Concerning 
Humanism” and selections from Being and Time to illuminate key terms and ideas that would 
otherwise be nonsensical in “The Question Concerning Technique.” 
 For our purposes, Heidegger’s “Question Concerning Technique” can be roughly broken 
into two parts. The first half of the essay is concerned with an account of the way in which the 
world is brought forth to man, by man. The second half of the essay is an attempt to nuance that 
                                               
8
 I use the word ‘build’ as a first move to unpack the role of the hands in Heidegger’s argument 
regarding technique. For Heidegger, Ge-stell, or enframing, is built out of the employment of techniques 
in our creation of the word in a sense that is both physical and metaphorical. 
9
 One could use Heidegger’s language here, but it would be of no help in the elaboration of his 
ideas for the sake of the argument I put forward. Regardless, one might trade life and language for terms 
like being, the destiny of mankind, objectification, homelessness, and more.  
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description in light of modern technologies My purpose is to illuminate both the practical and 
insidious impact that the use of technology can have on language and worldviews. I will come to 
name specific technologies that highlight this, but intend to clear a space for thinking about these 
issues in new ways, as the philosophical and political implications are both worth considering.  
 
On Translation 
 
The word technique is given in the title of Roger Berkowitz's translation of “Die Frage 
nach der Technik”; however, many translators often translate the title as “The Question 
Concerning Technology.” to translate Technik as technology misses the breadth with which 
Heidegger employs the term, which will be revealed and elaborated throughout this chapter. 
Further, translating Technik as technique allows an English reader to get a sense of the 
development of the pre-Socratic, post-socratic relationship, and specifically the modern 
relationship that mankind has to technique. Technique describes not only the processes through 
which we construct technologies, but the way in which we approach life and language in a world 
with technology. In addition, technique speaks to the relationship between art and technology (in 
the sense of poetics and hands-on crafting).  
I argue that while Heidegger creates a dichotomy between technique and modern 
technique — a distinction I will explore throughout this chapter — it doesn’t account for a new 
form of technique. I make the dichotomy into a tripartite distinction by introducing the idea of 
post-modern technique.
10
 In a preliminary sense, post-modern technique is a byproduct of new 
                                               
10
 Post-modern in my terms has nothing to do with postmodernism and the ideas therein, though 
one is welcome to explore any potential connections and report back to me. 
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technologies that separate the body from technique. I introduce this distinction here as it is subtle 
and is helpful to understand before delving into the arguments herein.  
.  
τέχνη  
 
τέχνη is typically translated as craftsmanship, or craft, or art. τέχνη is the Greek root of 
Heidegger’s Technik. Technique, which again is from Heidegger’s Technik, harkens to τέχνη. In 
Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism,” he argues that since Plato and Aristotle, thinking has 
garnered its value by establishing itself as a kind of τέχνη, that is, as “a process of deliberation in 
service to doing and making… already seen from the perspective of πρᾶξις [acting] and  ποίησις 
[creating]” (LOH, 240). Heidegger’s argument presents a negatively connotated interpretation on 
this “technical interpretation of thinking,” arguing that “such a characterization is a reactive 
attempt to rescue thinking and preserve its autonomy over against acting and doing… such an 
effort is the abandonment of the essence of thinking” (LOH, 240). It is in this way that thinking, 
for Heidegger, “slips out of its element” (LOH, 241).  
Heidegger’s argument in “The Question Concerning Technique” sheds more light on the 
word τέχνη. Heidegger argues that “τέχνη is not only the name for handworkly doing and skill, 
but also for high art and the fine arts. τέχνη belongs to bringing-forth, to ποίησις (poiesis); it is 
something poetic” (QCT, 9). τέχνη belongs to the process of bringing-forth certain realizations 
that may have otherwise remained hidden. Heidegger is arguing that the technique one employs 
in the construction of technology is rooted in artistic creation, but that artistic creation itself has 
been hijacked by public domination, the realm of the masses, of herd mentality. His concern is 
explicitly with the way in which the hands-on nature of technique is changing. My concern, 
which I will work towards elaborating, is with the way that technique is less tethered, and 
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potentially untethered from the hands — the body — altogether. What happens when our 
vantage point, in the Davidsonian sense, is obscured from technique? 
Heidegger writes that “τέχνη unconceals what does not bring itself forth by itself and 
does not yet lie present, what therefore can look sometimes this way, sometimes another, and can 
drop-out. He who builds a house or a ship or forges a sacrificial cup, unconceals what is to be 
brought-forth” (QCT, 9). τέχνη, for Heidegger, is a mode of unconcealing, of bringing what is 
hidden from plain sight forward. Yet we must ask, for whom is this unconcealing happening to? 
It is the shipbuilder for whom something is unconcealed as she builds the ship. It is the creator, 
the poet, etc. who experiences or witnesses the unconcealing of their craft as it happens. 
Unconcealing of what? Of technique, of the world and its way, a way of working of happening, a 
way of viewing the world — worldview.11 In this sense, τέχνη is a form of rendering privacy12 
manifest. Heidegger’s argument is that τέχνη is a mode “of rendering beings manifest” (LOH, 
259), but since this manifestation is only immediately available to the one involved in the τέχνη, 
we struggle to locate τέχνη in the context of public and private. Everyone can see the shipbuilder 
building, but only she can see what is unconcealed amidst her creating — the blur. The 
shipbuilder sees the ship unlike anyone else. Is this an obvious remark? It seems vital in the 
effort to ride against realism as I work towards my own conclusions.  
Moreover, Heidegger casts aspersions on τέχνη as it relates to thinking. As a technical 
process τέχνη is active, it connotes a doing. Yet, Heidegger argues that “the essence of thinking” 
                                               
11
 To be clear, Heidegger does not use the language of worldviews — this is my peppering. 
12
 Privacy here is limited insofar as the creator unconceals something new amidst their creating. 
What the nature of that which is unconcealed is, is not the topic of this paper. For what it is, for 
Heidegger, has a great deal to do with diminishing its thingness, abstracting from the senses, imaging that 
which may or may not be anew. As you can tell, these waters get murky and require too much German to 
break down. Fortunately, we can maintain the sense that what is unconcealed has something to do with 
intimate experience, with something entirely idiosyncratic, and in that sense, necessarily private. That’s 
good enough for our purpose. 
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(LOH, 240) is something solitudinous, as something involved not in acting, but in dwelling, in 
private (LOH, 239). This dwelling is necessarily a private affair. Heidegger presents this as a 
kind of essentialized, even divine mode of being. However, “private existence” itself has been 
altered by “its subservience to the public realm” (LOH, 242). Heidegger’s argument is that since 
thinking and hence language have come into the service of acting and doing (τέχνη) in a very 
practical sense in the public realm, thinking and hence language “comes under the dictatorship of 
the public realm, which decides in advance what is intelligible and what must be rejected as 
unintelligible” (LOH, 242). As a result, even when we go into our dwelling place, our language 
can no longer foster truth. This is why, for Heidegger, it is the poet, the one who abstracts 
language, makes it their own, can arrive at so-called truth. Heidegger names this state of being 
alienated from “the truth of being,” this aimless stumbling that we do in light of our inability to 
think about so-called “divine truths,” Heimatlosigkeit, or homelessness. (LOH, 258). 
Homelessness, for Heidegger, is not a socio-political term, but refers to the alienation of man 
from his “essential being” (LOH, 258). Homelessness is the alienation of man from his potential 
to speak truth, to experience truth. What matters most to my argument is that Heidegger’s 
connection, that thinking is a kind of dwelling with oneself that is challenged in important ways 
when τέχνη’s technical nature gets tied in, is making explicit that thinking, as a dwelling, 
involves oneself as a whole. Thinking requires sitting with oneself and navigating more than 
simply thought, but body. Thinking includes the Aristotelian pathos. Heidegger’s snapshot of the 
so-called essence of thought requires that we take seriously the body and its role in thinking. 
This is where the body is not merely a tool for persuasion, where Heidegger brings the body, 
brings emotion and what that word has come to mean in my usage, into the realm of meaning 
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making. The body enters the meaning of words insofar as it is involved in the use of words and 
the body influences the choice of wording one makes.  
 
Technique 
 
 Heidegger clarifies between technique and the essence of technique. Technique is not 
only a “means to an ends,” but a “doing of man,” which together come to be the “whole” of the 
arrangements that establish technique (QCT, 2-3). Technique connotes that which we actively 
do, whether artistically or otherwise, in order to “unconceal” (QCT, 9). And again, unconcealing 
connotes a “bringing-forth” of that which was previously hidden from plain view. Unconcealing 
is akin to ἀλήθεια, or truth (translated plainly).  
Technique can be employed to merely represent (Vorstellen), to bring forth appearances, 
or it can belong to τέχνη, to a kind of poetic doing. Technique as a mode of merely representing, 
as Vorstellen, is akin to poiesis to a kind of poetic bringing-forth, a bringing-forth that, in its very 
physical manifestation, in its hands-on bringing into being, it unconceals a truth that could not 
have before been seen. That technique can be a surface level appearance oriented doing or one 
that is more poetical, requires that we frame our understanding of technique around a doing, 
rather than as a thing, an object, with thingness, as that which we can not only objectify but also 
essentialize. As a doing, a happening, technique unfolds, there are steps. Unconcealing may 
happen in a moment but it becomes manifest because of this or that. In that sense, unconcealing 
(and a great deal else) necessarily, for Heidegger, is involved in causality, a causal chain. 
 
Causality & Affect 
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When a bat hits a ball, the ball is effected. It flies away. One needs no background in 
physics to believe me. When one hits a ball at a championship game, the ball is effected. It flies 
away. The audience is effected, they jump up and down. Is this merely effect? This is also a 
description of an affect, an emotional engagement. But why does it take a championship, why 
does it take stakes for people to jump up and down? There are states of being, affective states of 
being.  An argument might not only effect our behavior, but being persuaded might also mean a 
profound affectation.  
Heidegger writes that “for centuries philosophy has taught that there are four causes: 1. 
causa materialis, the material… 2. causa formalis, the form… 3. causa finalis, the end… 4. causa 
efficiens... the effect” (QCT, 5). While it is beyond the scope of this paper to outline each, they 
indicate the scientification of philosophy. The scientification of philosophy is, in part, due to the 
Platonic essentialism that attempts to say “what something is” (QCT, 3), which is a scientific 
pursuit insofar as it attempts to organize and objectify what, in Heidegger’s words, is not, which 
is referred to as Sein in German.
13
 To split causality into a neat fourfold system involves the risk 
of oversimplification, reductionism, and a whole host of other issues, but there is undoubtedly 
use-value. This use-value though can be easily overstated, insofar as pieces of causality that are 
irrational, or based on one’s idiosyncrasies in their observational apparti, can be overlooked, or 
pretended to be arbitrary. To bring this back to the question of technique, if we examine 
technique through the strict lens of the four causes, we are likely to miss these potentially 
irrational idiosyncrasies. These bits that resist objectification are most concisely represented by 
the idea of poiesis. The poetics, or the metaphorical, or the associative (insofar as our words are 
                                               
13
 Sein is translated to being, but it speaks to that part of beings, specifically human beings, that 
cannot be objectified, that which resists naming and rationalization in every person, but that we can easily 
lose sight of and instead blend into the masses.  
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constituted by idiosyncratic associations, many of which are shared, but some of which force us 
to dig for meaning in self and others), come to be fundamental in the unconcealing born out of 
one’s technique. 
Heidegger goes on to describe “the four causes” as "ways of being-responsible” and here 
we must give thought to the double meaning of the phrase “being-responsible” (QCT, 5). On one 
hand being-responsible is the sort of sentiment you might hear from your parents on a weekend 
night, but it also speaks to the responsibility to not only oneself, but to the world, to the poetic, to 
the potency of the potential for truth that may arise during one’s wonder about the world. 
Importantly, the notion of being-responsible, as I begin to unpack it, comes to be deeply relevant 
to the employment of modern and post-modern technologies
14
 and their role in enframing 
worldviews.  
Being-responsible as it relates to the four causes is elaborated with an example, the silver 
cup. When one makes a silver cup, it is made out of the material silver, which is co-responsible 
for it being, after one has formed it, a cup. Indeed, “the silver into which the outer-look as cup is 
let-in, the outer-look into which the silver appears, are both in their ways co-responsible for the 
sacrificial instrument” is a convoluted (though in the grand context of Heidegger it is fairly 
concise) way of saying that the material of the cup and the form it is given are both co-
responsible for the cup as a whole. This represents the causa materialis and the causa formalis, 
which involves naming the form of something, a definition that leads to a conception of causa 
finalis. From out of the end, “the thing does not cease to be” but rather “the thing begins to be 
                                               
14
 Modern technologies connotes not only the technologies that emerged in the post-socratic era, but also 
includes the notion that thinking itself changed with these technologies and the techniques people began 
employing were by no means different from philosophers, and in that sense the scientification of 
philosophy begins. Post-modern technology is an extension of this phenomenon that represents the 
disembodiment of technique. 
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what it will be after its being-set-forth” (QCT, 6). To be named, to be objectified, is to be “lying-
ready-before-us” in Heidegger’s language (QCT, 6). To lie before one as an object is to have an 
effect on one’s world, as something carved out, as a thing (QCT, 6). Stated differently, 
Heidegger is laying out the argument for how something comes to be named, but he does so with 
the intention of problematizing it. How a thing becomes a thing undoubtedly involves the 
formation of it, but that carving out is contingent not only on the thing itself, but the language 
that carves it up. That language, as I have argued, involves the body. Naming is a way of 
ordering. What is ordered is perceived, it stands out, it is individuated. 
 
Order & Bestand 
 
Being-responsible means not only bringing something into appearance, whether it be a 
cup or a painting, but forces us to consider what our role is in the process of carving things out in 
the world, whether we use a technique in bringing them forth or we use a technique or a 
technique informs what is individuated. Once we do that, it is ordinary for one to then 
communicate their picture of their world, to attempt to get others to see things their way, to 
persuade them of a particular view of the world. Heidegger calls this a Ver-an-lassen. 
Veranlassen, without dashes, ordinarily means to cause, occasion, or to bring about. By using 
dashes — as Berkowitz points out in a footnote — Heidegger means to restore the root sense of 
the phrase, which means “completing a letting-in” (QCT, 7). Here we have a play with bringing 
forth and letting in, two phrases that illuminate contrast. Technique brings forth insofar as it 
makes appear, technique lets in insofar as accepts a carving out, a definition, and objectification. 
There is a sense in which what I have described is both a passive and active affair. 
Technique can be employed to individuate objects or to construct them. This parallels with the 
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notion that there is a worldview I construct and one that is constructed for me. A worldview I 
actively make sense of and persuade others of and a worldview that I have been persuaded by.  
What comes to be an object is what comes to stand. What stands is necessarily ordered, it 
is put forth in such a way that we can see it stand, this is Bestand. Bestand can be curated by or 
for us. We can make things stand or we experience the way in which things are made to stand by 
others. In this sense there is a way in which I actively construct a worldview and a way in which 
a worldview is constructed for me by others. Things stand insofar as they appear to us, but 
beyond the question of causality, what does this standing consist of? "The ordered has its own 
stand. We name it Bestand” (QCT, 13). To order, to make Bestand, is the first step in curation, it 
precedes Ge-stell insofar as Ge-stell relies on enframing what has been ordered. Curation in this 
sense is very similar to the process of hanging art in a museum. The ordering of the art has its 
own stand, creates its own story, it involves a view of the world that would be different if 
ordered differently, in very plain terms. What is ordered is only so because of its ordering 
(Bestellen) and is ordered out of the orderable (Bestellbar). Bestand, Bestellen, and Bestellbar 
are described as having their “ground in what comes to language” (QCT, 14). It is in this sense, 
for Heidegger, that what is ordered, while it has its stand, while it constitutes a kind of image, is 
still subject to an individual’s perspective, yet that perspective is necessarily going to be tied into 
the ordering itself. To illuminate this idea, Heidegger says that “Man can of course represent, 
shape, and pursue this or that in such or such a way… man does not have at his disposal the 
unconcealedness into which the actual shows itself or withdraws… The thinker only answered 
what addressed itself to him” (QCT, 14). This is echoed by my previous mention of the 
Davidsonian vantage point. Fundamental to understand here is that technique informs that 
vantage point, alters it in both subtle and notable ways. In constructing conceptual schemes we 
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cannot escape our perch, our body, and the limits of our language. And yet we are persuade and 
do persuade people of all kinds of concepts, especially those that claim to transcend our place in 
the world. On the whole, this highlights is the interplay between what is ordered, how it is 
ordered, and how one perceives that ordering, which is inevitably tied into the ordering itself.  
Technique involves an ordering, a way of putting things together, of gathering in order to 
have some object, something carved out, stand on its own. Bestand speaks to the order of the 
thing itself, what is intended as the thing itself amidst the technique that constructs it. 
Importantly, Bestand doesn’t speak to what lies around the thing, what lies around or beneath 
technique. For this, Heidegger uses Ge-stell. A term we will now dig right into. 
 
Enframing & Ge-stell 
 
 In order to understand Ge-stell, it was vital to introduce terms like τέχνη, technique, 
causality, being-responsible, unconcealing, and Bestand. Ge-stell, given its fundamental role in 
the arguments to come, must be reckoned with carefully. To this end, I will provide a relatively 
significant portion of text. As a form of stellen, Heidegger uses Ge-stell in line with these other 
terms, which are mentioned in the quotes to follow. Heidegger’s use of words that share roots 
leads to an etymological continuity that is near impossible to capture in one-to-one translation. 
The continuity he employs reflects the way in which curation functions, it is a seamless part of 
our lives that is difficult to identify unless we explore what underlies technologies and consider 
the techniques that technologies are founded on. 
While Ge-stell is ordinarily, and perhaps most appropriately, translated as enframing. In 
order to maintain the etymological connections that Heidegger is carving out, I’ll stick with the 
German Ge-stell, but it can be aptly, though not fully, translated as enframing. Heidegger’s 
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initial definition of Ge-stell is difficult to stomach on its own and requires more work to get a 
sense of, but it is a useful starting point: 
 
Ge-stell is the gathering of this putting (Stellen) that puts (stellt), i.e. summons man to 
unconceal the actual in the way of ordering (Bestellen) as Bestand. Ge-stell is the way of 
unconcealing that sways in the essence of modern technique, and is itself nothing 
technical. To the technical belongs by contrast all that we know as barring, pushing and 
framing, and what is a piece of Bestand of what we name montage (QCT, 16). 
 
To gather the putting that puts means to enframe insofar as in one’s gathering, in one’s 
employment of a technique, one necessarily constructs a frame through which they see the world 
and what is in it. This is a summoning insofar as, for example, one is creating a silver cup, we are 
not only seeing silver as a thing with a use, but drinking as a practice facilitated by cup. The 
technique employed for drinking changes when one stops using their hand or tongue to lap it up 
and instead uses the silver cup. In this sense, the summoning sways through the essence of 
modern technique insofar as with each of our creations, with each of our engagements we begin 
to carve up the world anew, and it is not simply the objects carved out, but the way in which we 
see the world itself that is of concern. Ge-stell, enframing, means not only framing a thing, but 
framing how it is that we see all things. In a sense, in making a cup, I make my world anew in a 
nebulous range of ways. What is ordered can be ordered by me, it can be a result of my own 
creation, or it can be ordered for me. If I do not create the cup, but I use it, the ordered, what is 
brought-forth comes to inform my worldview despite my disconnect from the construction of the 
object itself. 
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Heidegger goes on to explore the importance of stellen in Ge-stell especially as it relates 
back to the idea of τέχνη, insofar as τέχνη is entangled with poiesis: 
 
The word ‘stellen’ in the title Ge-stell does not mean only summoning, it is at the same 
time to preserve the resonance of another ‘Stellen,’ out of which it stems namely that of 
the setting-forth-and-there, in the sense of poiesis, that lets what is present come forth in 
unconcealedness” (QCT, 17). 
 
In this sense, Ge-stell speaks to the idea that with technique, with a kind of bringing-forth, a 
setting-forth, in our poetic creations, we are unconcealing insofar as a creation brings something 
new forth, and yet, this enframes insofar as what is unconcealed to us is unconcealed within a 
frame, insofar as creation entails limitations. To enframe, to Ge-stell, is for something to be 
summoned, but that summoning is part of the sway of Ge-stell through modern technique, 
“which requires the orderability of nature as Bestand” (QCT, 18). The ordered is brought into a 
frame through our ordering and hence summoning. What comes to hand, comes to hand with all 
that lies around it, but that context is necessarily altered by the new object that is carved out 
within it. Heidegger’s mention that there is a poetic element to Stellen supports the idea I posed 
earlier in the section on causality. There is a sense of affectation. A sense that what is enframed, 
what comes to stand within a frame, has the capacity to affect one, that is their body and their 
language. That what is framed by us and for us, what constitutes our worldview, that we come to 
be persuaded by or persuade others of is deeply related to the affective state, the habitus of the 
body. 
 Heidegger notes a highly particular and relevant concern regarding the essence of 
technique resting in Ge-stell. As enframing, Ge-stell makes it such that in our handlyworking we 
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are distanced from poiesis, from the poetics of creation, because “technique must employ the 
exact science of nature” (QCT, 19). This is to say that in order to bring something forth, we must 
navigate the frames that have been provided for the utilization of our techniques. This is a deeply 
hands-on oriented remark. To see an object as an object that has been brought forth by a 
technique is to see an object that has been brought forth according to the science of nature that 
man has and continues to try and master.  
  
Curation & Ge-stell 
 
 To live in the modern world with modern technologies is to live amidst the frames of 
technique. I use the word curation as one deeply intertwined with the idea of Ge-stell that 
Heidegger presents. Modern technologies of late not only have the capacity to enframe according 
to the exact science of nature, but have the capacity to enframe by generating an objectifiable 
sense of one’s self. To be in the modern world is to be understood according to the Ge-stell that 
sways through the technologies we engage and the techniques we employ. Post-modern 
technologies — algorithms15 being an excellent example — have the capacity to enframe our 
interests, our passions, and to encircle them with data points, hence turning the parts of self 
previously held as subjectivity idiosyncrasies as outlined and utilized points of interpretation in 
order to present a feedback loop that speaks to our imagined sense of self and our imagined sense 
of the world. This is to say that those aspects of self that are so nebulous that they constitute a 
kind of darkness that is only accessible as an imagination are now traceable and manipulatable, 
which is to say that our worldview can be curated accordingly for practical and insidious 
                                               
15
 Algorithms will be given a more substantial definition in the next chapter. 
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purposes. This doesn’t just constitute a set of circumstances but a way of life as a modern amidst 
modern technique. 
 
Curation & The Absurd 
 
 The curation of worldviews in the era of the modern human condition presents one with 
inevitable absurdities. Phil Elverum (AKA Mount Eerie), a philosopher and artist, captures the 
circumstance of the absurd in the modern human condition amidst the enframing and curation of 
worldviews aptly in a two part song called “Through the Trees.”16 The song’s two parts are on 
two different albums, as if to highlight the disjointedness of perspectives that contemporary 
humans cope with, the way in which the seemingly irrational bubbles up, reinforcing itself. His 
songs focus on the unbuilt world and reckon with the realization that humans now navigates the 
unbuilt world from our worldview that is informed by and enframed in the built world, a world 
of technique. 
 The song lyrics are a poem. The first part of the poem begins with two lines that construct 
a dichotomy between the built and unbuilt world and the subjects view of them both 
simultaneously: “from up on the hill I can see the lights / of town through the trees” (TtT, Pt. 1). 
To inhabit the modern human conditions and live amongst technique is to view the unbuilt, 
which is specifically unbuilt nature (nature can be crafted, think of the forests in Europe for 
example), through the frame of the built. The built, technology, sways through, Ge-stell, 
enframes, how we view the unbuilt. Indeed, the notion of swaying that arises throughout 
Heidegger’s “Question Concerning Technique” is reflected in the line “and there is wind. / there 
                                               
16
 Songs can be heard on the albums Clear Moon and Wind’s Poem on 
<https://pwelverumandsun.bandcamp.com/>. Further citation is in bibliography. 
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is only wind” (TtT, Pt. 1). The subject struggles not only to cope with the circumstance of 
modern life, but to isolate some piece of causality, some piece that makes the irrational sensible. 
The poem continues: “do I disdain them? that "land of dreams" / from up here you can see them 
living / on the way home, through the trees / I have climbed the hill at twilight / to find the 
source of wind / from up on the hill / I can see the lights of town / that land of dreams / through 
the trees” (TtT, Pt. 1). The subject is not only in a reckoning with the implications of seeing the 
unbuilt world through the light of the town, but is so taken by the allure of the unbuilt that the 
subject seeks out the source of the wind, an entirely fruitless engagement, one so without end it 
represents the kind of alienation that Heidegger describes man has with the rise of modern 
technique. While the trees are causally revealed by the trees, the causality of the unbuilt is 
fleeting, concealed. To seek out the source of wind is to stumble through the darkness of the 
unbuilt, and yet one seeks the source because in the era of modern technique all sensation 
demands explanation, the unbuilt itself becauses subject to the four causes and involves a 
rational engagement with that which is beyond reason. How do we find the source of the wind? 
In a given moment, how might we answer that query? While the wind is strongest on the hill, the 
hill itself surely isn’t its source, and yet from that vantage the built is unconcealed anew again. 
The subject is engaged in a yearning for description of that which avoids description, of that 
which sways through, of that which is concealed to us because of modern technique. The subject, 
entrenched in a worldview curated by modern technique, is engaged in an absurd pursuit. 
 While it’s unclear if Phil Elverum is deliberately in conversation with Heidegger, the 
poem serves as a potent way of communicating profoundly subtle remarks. Poetry’s affective 
capacity not only helps move our argument forward, but it reinforces, through its employment, 
the argument made in Chapter 1. Part two of “Through the Trees” grapples more explicitly with 
41 
 
 
the absurdity of modern technique. With the drive to describe that which evades description the 
subject of the poem encounters, in entirely explicit terms, the dichotomy of the built and unbuilt:   
 
I go on describing this place 
and the way it feels to live and die. 
The “natural world”  
and whatever else it’s called 
I drive in and out of town  
seeing no edge, breathing sky  
and it’s hard to describe   
without seeming absurd.   
I know there’s no other world:  
Mountains and websites. (TtT, Pt. 2)  
 
Grappling with the absurdity of life with post-modern technique and Ge-stell is captured in the 
final lines. The entire section illuminates the idea I have been thrashing at, the idea that in the era 
of modern technique, the way in which we come to know the world, the way in which we 
describe it, is enframed by the techniques we employ and are affected by. While it is tempting to 
begin to indulge in an attempt to trace the causal chains at work in this paradigm, one would be, 
as the poem reveals, damned to being absurd in their attempt to describe.  
 Yet, as I described in Chapter 1, this realm, the realm of being which goes beyond reason, 
is the realm of persuasion. To describe this circumstance, to convey it to another in hopes that 
they begin to see it my way, would be to rely on persuasion. To reiterate, poetry reaches into the 
realm that works with concepts beyond reason. Poetics and persuasion are intertwined, but 
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clearly distinct, a distinction that has been sketched out throughout this project in many 
moments. In this sense, persuasion and poetry are intertwined. Though, as I will argue in Chapter 
3, persuasion is in a state of dramatic decline in the world of post-modern technique. In the world 
of modern technique, in a world of the enframing of modern technique, we are engulfed in the 
rational and yet it falls out of sight. Technique, despite its reliance of the laws of nature, conceals 
its cause. In developing a sense of self, a worldview, in the world of modern technique, we are 
simultaneously engaged in the objectification of the self, a self guided by objective causes, 
whether algorithms and laws of nature, and yet that objectivity obscures, it conceals and entails a 
sense of absurdity in the attempt to describe the state. Indeed, in the world of modern technique, 
in our attempt to describe our circumstance, we are, as Elverum describes it, “clawing for 
meaning” (TtT, Pt. 2).17 Yet that meaning is made in a world in which one may very well be 
inhabiting the absurd, which Elverum gets at with the final lines of the poem: “A pile of trash / 
the fog on the hill / standing in a parking lot squinting” (TtT, Pt. 2). The final lines sum up the 
crux of my belaboured point, that in this absurd circumstance, living in the unbuilt natural world 
enframed by the built world of technology, our worldview is curated, the way we see all is 
profoundly impacted by this circumstance the nature of that enframing is profoundly important 
in the quest for description of self and circumstance. Indeed, no matter where we stand, on the 
hill looking through the trees, or in a parking lot next to a pile of trash, our very view of the 
world, both metaphorically and literally, is influenced, and our clawing for meaning is aptly 
described as a kind of squinting. 
 
 
                                               
17
 Worth noting that Emerson describes an immensely similar search for meaning in his essay 
“Fate.” This is beyond the scope of this project, but worth investigating if this point strikes you. 
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Chapter 3 
 
The Curated Algorithm in Theory & Practice 
 
 I am arguing that persuasion — in the era of post-modern technique — is dramatically 
diminishing (insofar as being persuasive is an artform that is rarely employed) and the two 
arguments posed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 — of persuasion and technique — add up to the 
claim that there is a new mode of alienation from the body and hence that which belongs to 
poiesis, that which involves pathos, insofar as a worldview is less tethered to the body and 
subject to profound degrees of curation. The curated algorithm gives me grounds to make that 
claim stronger.  
 An algorithm is a process or set of calculations intended to solve a problem. Algorithms 
are used for computers and help not only organize data for the sake of presentation, but are also 
used for computer programming. The reason that algorithms have the capacity to curate a 
worldview is because they can be used to organize data about an individual, based on their 
computer usage, and present them with information that is relevant to their interests based on 
their data footprint. Algorithms are immensely practical and entirely prolific in the 21st century, 
but have the capacity to be used for insidious purposes. Regardless of their use, they have a 
profound impact on how we come to be presented with information (whether factually consistent 
or not) about the world and henceforth profoundly impact ordinary communication and language 
itself.  
Algorithms are entirely prolific, yet are mostly hidden in contemporary life. Economic 
markets, social media, databases, and various facets of our digitally enabled lives are guided by 
algorithms. Algorithms are nothing new and have long been important in solving mathematical 
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and technological problems The data that an algorithm uses regarding a particular individual has 
come to determine what information is presented to the individual through their technology — 
this is the crux of a curated algorithm. Many online services use curated algorithms to improve 
the experience for consumers using the technology. Stated again, but differently, a curated 
algorithm is a process through which a user's experience is made more efficient. Its purpose is to 
tailor to the user by using previously collected data points about them in order to improve their 
current experience on an online platform. For example, there is a music group named Porches. 
“Porches” as a search term also refers to a part of the structure of a home. On my personalized 
web browser, I often visit Porches’s website, that is Porches the music group. I listen to their 
music on various devices, read news about them, I even have them as friends on social media 
platforms, and so on. I have never once looked into owning or building a home. If I type 
“Porches” into a search engine, their curated algorithm has enough data about me to prioritize 
presenting me the music group's most recent news over porches on a house. The search results, 
the links to different media presented to a user, would be dramatically different with the same 
search term “porches” if another user had recently purchased a home. Indeed, if I began 
searching for a home online, my results might begin to change when I type in the word 
“porches.” While this is a benign example of how the internet, as a technological medium, 
curates how one sees the world, it gives immediate insight into how a curated algorithm 
functions, and how it can come to carve out what one engages with when they use this kind of 
technology. Indeed, a curated algorithm has the capacity to frame how one sees the world, 
insofar as it necessarily prioritizes certain information. This is an immense power to wield, and it 
is indeed wielded as algorithms are designed by human beings, but human beings also set them 
to their task and let the algorithm work as it will. Process can be prioritized over outcome.   
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The purpose of a curated algorithm is to curate what is brought forth into one’s view of 
the world. While the previous example was entirely practical and benign, there are insidious uses 
of curated algorithms that have a profound impact on communication. For instance, Facebook, 
uses a curated algorithm that gives preferences to posts that you are predisposed to like, based on 
your previous internet data. Political news, for example, is organized such that only news that fits 
your established political leanings will be shown to you, but news that may be dissonant, 
unfamiliar  will likely not be prioritized, such that you may never see it, one’s worldview may 
never account for a side of a story you may be entirely inundated with. 
Curated algorithms have mass effect. They necessarily impact billions of people on earth, 
whether they have investments in markets, they use the internet at all, or actively engage in 
social media. In light of the last two chapters, the implications that this kind of technology has on 
communication are pertinent to consider. Heidegger’s arguments about technique were based on 
the subtleties of Ge-stell in the era of modern technique, but no longer is Ge-stell a subtle 
swaying, but it has come to be programmed into some forms of technology itself. Ge-stell, in this 
context, doesn’t sway through technique, but is now part of the technique itself. Employing a 
technique is the employment of a frame, and it can entirely subvert the role of the body and lead 
to a kind of post-modern disembodiment, wherein persuasion becomes a useless affair insofar as 
the body is not engageable in the ways that the likes of Aristotle and Wittgenstein describe. 
 
Technology’s Implications for Worldviews and Persuasion 
 
 Heidegger’s analysis of technique leads to the basic claim that modern technique, 
represented aptly by technology, enframes our worldview insofar as modern technologies force 
us to see the world in particular ways, because it reveals only what is revealed and conceals a 
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great deal more. So much of Heidegger’s analysis revolves around examples that involve some 
kind of hands-on practice that it is hard to detach the body and its role from his theory. The 
hands are tethered to the technique. For Heidegger, how we come to know the world — the ideas 
we come to believe in the world — has a great deal to do with how we physically engage the 
world. Post-modern technique alters that, insofar as post-modern technique is defined as a way of 
the hands — the body — being untethered from the technique.  
I make a cup with my hands, I build a house, I change the landscape, I change the mode 
of reaching ends and my worldview alters. I construct an algorithm and it builds without me, it 
carries forward without the body, and my worldview still alters. With that said, in Heidegger’s 
terms, persuasion still has an active and fruitful role in communication. In the world of modern 
technique, persuasion has no significantly diminished role that I can name, the body is still 
tethered to technique. In the world of post-modern technique, however, persuasion is diminishing 
in its activity and effect. Also, consider, beyond the causal claim I made in the previous sentence, 
the affective impact.  
To be clear, persuasion, which involves ideas beyond reason, is still employable today. It 
is not as if persuasion has somehow disappeared from our language in totality. However, when 
we try to persuade by reaching beyond the frame of post-modern technique, we often run into 
issues insofar as seeing beyond that frame is made difficult for one’s worldview to account for. 
Reaching beyond the frame of post-modern technique is best understood as an attempt to unsee 
the world that we are constantly inundated with, an attempt to contradict what constitutes a 
cohesive system of beliefs that are constantly instilled by technologies that one cannot even see. 
Consider the man who steadfastly believes that the world has only been in existence for fifty 
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years What we are seeing today, with what are in this context post-modern technologies, is the 
hands, the body, becoming untethered from technique.  
 To engage post-modern techniques is not at all to involve the hands — the curated 
algorithm is the clearest and most prolific example. Persuasion diminishes not because the frame 
shrinks, but because what is presented in the frame is now curated by that which lies under it. A 
curated algorithm orders the enframing without any hands-on engagement being involved. To 
persuade in the paradigm would be to not just present claims that counter one’s pre-existing 
beliefs, but to make claims that counter one's view of the world, a much more difficult task 
indeed. In the era of post-modern technique we become disembodied, our beliefs can be ordered 
without our knowing, and curated such that a seamless worldview is presented, again and again, 
on so many platforms that anything counter to it would seem an absurdity. To persuade someone 
in this context becomes all the more difficult if persuasion relies on so much that has to do with 
pathos, with that which involves the body. Our worldviews, then, for those of us engaged with 
these technologies, comes to be constituted differently. One might argue that this constitution is 
more narrow. This involves a kind of value judgement that seems hard to reinforce, as narrow is 
a pejorative, but the argument by no means seems to be unfounded. 
 
Persuasion & Disembodiment 
  
 There is a sense in which there is a worldview that is of my own making and a worldview 
that I take on, but am not the creator of. It is the latter sense that represents curation. It is the 
latter sense that is subject to be disembodied. The former sense, in my terms, necessarily 
involves the body. The latter sense, in Heidegger’s terms, does involve the body, but the nuance I 
mean to contribute is that this embodiment is not necessarily mutually inclusive.  
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 The question must then become this: how can we persuade a worldview that is 
disembodied?  
 To be clear, when I speak of disembodiment, I do not mean to say that the body is 
entirely removed. The body has a shifting role. Disembodiment is a kind of detachment from a 
person’s role in the construction of their own worldview, and this disembodiment is a of a 
physical kind. Curation is not mere manipulation, as it is with Ge-stell, but a hidden way of 
ordering, of making things stand, Bestand. This kind of ordering is detached from pathos insofar 
as it is not formed by persuasive speech acts that involve the body, but instead rely on presenting 
an image of the world that presents itself as entirely objective, as totally cohesive, even if this is 
far from the case. Total truth in the mode I described is a tactic of totalitarian regimes in their 
propaganda, but post-modern techniques conceals so much of what might be visible, and not 
only does it conceal, it tailors a worldview to an individual. Curated worldviews involve the 
employment of big data, of massive numbers of people's data footprints used and analyzed to 
construct a worldview that is not only accounting for one’s idiosyncrasies, but constructs a 
common vocabulary amongst a variety of users who can be viewed as similar. Curated 
algorithms are in the business of constructing vocabularies  to unify particular groups of people 
and to reinforce those views, such that one would have to actively seek out opinions that are 
different, rather than encounter them as they come according to a unadulterated set of opinions 
might.  
 To be sure, humans have always been able to group off, to choose their own kinds of 
people, and construct vocabularies with people similar to themselves. But these spaces are meant 
to constitute the merely social, or the private, not the public sphere; however, our public sphere 
has come to be curated and polarized in this way by post-modern technique. To tailor 
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information to one’s idiosyncrasies, to subvert the body, and to curate a worldview that instills 
what has been framed out and orders it cohesively is the impact of post-modern technique and 
that has profound implications for communication and how we impart belief in everyday life. My 
purpose has been to argue that there are indeed implications and to make suggestions about what 
those implications are. I leave it to the reader and to myself to, in new works, explore the 
implications further and wonder whether the changing modes of communication that are taking 
place require turning our technologies in new directions. 
 
Beyond the Trees: Concluding on the Absurd 
 
 In my view, poetry has been the most effective means of getting at the crux of many ideas 
posed herein. The ideas that demand poetry tend to be those that have implications on that which 
is beyond reason. The argument I have posed in this paper might leave one wondering about 
authenticity or the possibility of subverting the circumstance of post-modern technique. I do not 
pretend to have solutions to these issues, but have only just begun the process of identifying 
these new problems for philosophy, and philosophers, in hopes of contributing to a nuanced 
understanding of communication in our world. The philosophy of language, like all genres of 
thought, relies on new ideas being born out of a particular ordering of past ideas that make a 
discipline pregnant with a new thought. That this ordering can be done by an algorithm, one 
designed by humans that then operates independently of us must be considered seriously for its 
implications on communication itself, which has both philosophical, political, and ontological 
implications that requires ethical investigations into the technologies that mobilize these 
massively impactful techniques. Just as a teacher curates the readings for a class, new 
technologies, new techniques can curate a view of the world that has a profound impact on the 
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public. The absurd, the irrational might be one viable mode of being to subvert the curation of 
worldviews that are of the kind that are disembodied.  
 Wallace Stevens's “Of Mere Being” presents a working sense of what I mean by the 
previous statement: 
 
The palm at the end of the mind, 
Beyond the last thought, rises 
In the bronze distance, 
 
A gold-feathered bird 
Sings in the palm, without human meaning, 
Without human feeling, a foreign song. 
 
You know then that it is not the reason 
That makes us happy or unhappy. 
The bird sings. Its feathers shine. 
 
The palm stands on the edge of space. 
The wind moves slowly in the branches. 
The bird’s fire-fangled feathers dangle down. (PWS, 169). 
 
There are a few distinct threads to distill from this poem that inform the ideas in posed herein. 
Stevens employs a pun. Palm, on one hand, is a kind of tree. Palm, in Greek, is the name for a 
phoenix, a gold-feathered fire-fangled bird. It is in this sense that the bird, which “sings in the 
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palm,” is also the palm. Eleanor Cook writes about this play on words saliently: “the bird ‘sings 
in the palm’ and through a pun is the palm. So also the poem is contained in its words or its 
leaves, and vice versa; it also is its words or leaves. So also space is contained in the mind, and 
vice versa; it also is the mind” (Cook). She goes on to say that “the ‘last thought’ is the last 
thought possible before we move beyond reason, whether toward imagination or toward death” 
(Cook). While her purpose is merely to examine the word-play that Stevens invents, it helps 
reveal some of the philosophical underpinnings of this poem. To be amidst modern and post-
modern technique forces the palm, in its dual sense, to be concealed. The disembodiment of post-
modern technique involves — as a result of its constant objectification and drive to reinforce a 
consistent worldview via curation — blurring the song “in the palm” that is “without human 
meaning, without human feeling,” because there is no place for it to neatly fit.  
If that which is beyond reason is blurred, if it is out of reach, than pathos falters, as 
emotion becomes something to be rationalized. Stevens is clear in his saying that “it is not the 
reason that makes us happy or unhappy,” which is to say that it is not reasons that makes us 
happy or unhappy, but that which is beyond reason. That which extends beyond the frame of 
reason, that which challenges Ge-stell, that which is “the palm” which “stands on the edge of 
space.” In a moment that unifies the aforementioned Elverum poem and this Wallace Stevens 
poem, Stevens describes the wind as moving “slowly in the branches.” The unbuilt world sways 
through itself, unconcealing emotion, whether happiness or otherwise. We are persuaded by that 
which blows the palm at the end of the mind, or we are shocked by it. We may be moved to 
resist it or embrace it, but that move to resist or embrace is itself contingent on the body. 
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